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ABSTRACT 
After the repeal of the Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule in 
2016, direct combat positions in Special Operations Command (SOCOM) opened to 
women, along with all other positions in the U.S. military. Since then, relatively few 
women have attempted or completed the accession programs in SOCOM for these 
previously closed positions. Women can offer unique benefits to SOCOM like reduced 
signature management, increased access to women in conservative cultures, and the use 
of different risk analysis strategies. Understanding how many women have already and 
will be entering SOCOM has become a relevant question. This thesis attempts to predict 
the number of women who will enter SOCOM and evaluates different strategies to 
enhance this integration. I developed a model that predicts the number of women entering 
SOCOM in previously closed positions. Then, I altered this steady state model to predict 
the performance of three different strategies aimed at women’s recruitment, selection, 
and retention in SOCOM. Performance of these strategies was evaluated using five 
criteria: numerical performance, costs, controllability and reactivity, tenability, and 
impacts to performance. Retention-based strategies predicted few additional women in 
SOCOM but performed the best in our meta-analysis due to their benefits in performance, 
cost, and tenability. Other gender-specific programs may need to be leveraged for 
SOCOM to reliably profit from the unique benefits women offer. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
After the repeal of the Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule  
(DGCDAR) in 2016, approximately 15,500 direct combat positions in Special Operations 
Command (SOCOM) became open to women, along with all other positions in the U.S. 
military.1 Since then, relatively few women have attempted or completed the accession 
programs in SOCOM for these previously closed positions.  
Women offer unique benefits to SOCOM like reduced signature management, 
increased access to women in conservative cultures,2 and the use of different risk analysis 
strategies.3 Understanding how many women will be entering SOCOM becomes an 
interesting and relevant question. Early predictions from SOCOM commanders for the 
number of women who would qualify and graduate in these newly opened billets would be 
low.4 Predicting the number of women who will enter SOCOM becomes important to 
inform legislation and polices that might otherwise change or amend the battle-tested 
assessment and selection pipelines in these communities.  
To do this, I created a system dynamics model that predicts the number of women 
who will enter SOCOM. This steady state model predicts that few women (71.6 women) 
would hold these newly opened billets SOCOM 20 years later. I became interested in 
evaluating different strategies to enhance gender integration by altering the steady state 
model to reflect the changes of implementing three strategies focused on recruitment, 
selection, and retention. The initial analysis showed varied performance across these three 
                                                 
1 Thomas Szayna et al., Considerations for Integrating Women into Closed Occupations in the U.S. 
Special Operations Forces, RR1058 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2015), xv. https://doi.org/
10.7249/RR1058. 
2 U.S. Army War College, Female Engagement Teams (FET) Blueprint. Carlisle, PA U.S. Army War 
College, 2017.https://www.academia.edu/35312738/_U_Female_Engagement_Teams_FET_Blueprint.pdf, 
2. 
3 Christine R Harris and Michael Jenkins, “Gender Differences in Risk Assessment: Why Do Women 
Take Fewer Risks than Men?” Judgment and Decision Making 1, no. 1 (2006), 61. 
4 B.L. Losey, “Female Integration Implementation Plan for Naval Special Warfare,” Official 
memorandum. San Diego, CA: Department of the Navy Naval Special Warfare Command, 2015. 
https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/WISR_Implementation_Plan_Navy.pdf. 
xvi 
strategies. Both the recruitment and retention strategies did little to increase the number of 
women in SOCOM, predicting 94.2 women and 107.5 women, respectively, when 
compared to the selection strategy, which increased the representation to 1,441.2 women  
in 20 years and beyond tokenism closer to critical mass, where groups benefit the most 
from gender integration.5 The performance of these different strategies was then evaluated 
using five criteria: numerical performance, costs, controllability and reactivity, tenability, 
and impacts to performance.  
The research suggests that even over a large time horizon, the steady state processes 
will not result in many women entering SOCOM. The selection strategy produced 
impressive numerical results, but suffered when evaluating performance and tenability. 
Retention-based strategies predicted few additional women in SOCOM but, due to their 
benefits in performance, cost, and tenability, performed the best in the meta-analysis. This 
research concluded that a retention strategy is the best method to increase the number of 
women in SOCOM due to its meta-analysis net score and the fact that they are the only 
strategies that predicted an increase in the organizational performance in SOCOM. For 
further research, other programs, like the ad hoc Cultural Support Teams, may need to be 
leveraged for SOCOM to reliably benefit from the unique benefits women offer.  
                                                 
5 Rosabeth Moss Kanter, Men and Women of the Corporation (New York: Basic Books, 1977). 
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1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
We are all committed to implementing this change without compromising 
readiness or morale or our warfighting capabilities 
Leon E. Panetta1 
 
Despite all positions being open to women after the repeal of the Direct Ground 
Combat Definition and Assignment Rule (DGCDAR) in 2016, few women have sought 
accession in the newly opened Special Operations Command (SOCOM) billets.2 From 
2016 to 2018, one women entered these billets as an Army Ranger despite applicants across 
all the newly opened positions.3 Different policies and strategies have been examined to 
increase the representation of women in these newly opened positions based on examples 
of foreign integrated militaries. These comparisons, however, may lead to false 
equivalencies that are of limited use due to a myriad of factors, including how different 
countries employ their militaries, their demographics (volunteer, conscription, levels of 
skill, and education), their size, and the capabilities of the forces.4 Further, determining 
how to best support gender integration in SOCOM remains fraught with controversy, partly 
due to the nature of the relationship between Congress and the Department of Defense. 
Colton C. Campbell and David P. Aueswald examine this relationship in Congress and 
Civil-Military Relationships: 
                                                 
1 Claudette Roulo, “Defense Department Expands Women’s Combat Role,” DOD News (January 24, 
2013): https://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=119098 
2 Jessica Glicken Turnley et al., “Special Operations Forces Mixed-Gender Elite Teams” (Tampa, FL: 
The Joint Special Operations University’s Center for Special Operations Studies and Research, 2014). 
https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/wisr-studies/SOCOM%20-
%20JSOU%20Study%20on%20Special%20Operations%20Forces%20Mixed-
Gender%20Elite%20Team3.pdf. 
3 Jeff Pavelko, “USSOCOM Implementation Plan Progress” (Women in Service Review brief to OSD 
16 Jan 2018). https://dacowits.defense.gov/Portals/48/Documents/General%20Documents/RFI%20Docs/
June2017/SOCOM%20RFI%202.pdf?ver=2017-06-07-221616-277. 
4 Agnes Gereben Schaefer et al., Implications of Integrating Women into the Marine Corps Infantry, 
RR1103 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2015). https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/
RR1103.html, 44. 
2 
Congress has overturned the military ban of gays serving openly and has 
had a say in lifting the combat exclusion for military women. It has imposed 
significant budget cuts through the sequestration process, forcing the 
Department of Defense (DOD) to reexamine military strategy, personnel 
numbers, and weapon purchases. And most recently, lawmakers from both 
sides of the aisle have proposed legislation to take the decision for 
prosecuting sexual assault cases out of the hands of commanding officers—
a move that military leaders say would hurt their ability to maintain order 
and discipline.5  
While acknowledging the friction this relationship creates, this civil-military 
relationship is both good and necessary to build the trust that exists between the American 
people and its military. Strong motivations and biases have the potential to influence the 
policies and strategies implementing gender integration due in part to the high risk of 
special operations and the criticality of the missions they perform. The RAND corporation 
reported 85% of SOF members surveyed opposed letting women into their specialty, the 
predominate concern being the “potential impact on mission effectiveness and their 
continued ability to function as a highly performing team central to participants 
concerns.”6 Legislators, by comparison, may be motivated by interests in social progress, 
inclusivity, and equal opportunities for women. This thesis will attempt to objectively 
evaluate these policies and strategies by developing a system dynamics model that will 
predict the number of women who will enter SOCOM in these previously closed billets, 
and using those results, recommend strategies for optimized implementation and 
opportunities for further research. Of note, this thesis is not arguing for or against gender 
integration in direct combat occupational specialties; this thesis will be evaluating the 
performance of different strategies in support of gender integration within SOCOM. 
Defining and differentiating the terms “sex” and “gender” will be helpful to ensure 
these terms are not conflated throughout this thesis. Sex is determined by socially agreed 
upon observable biological characteristics including gonadal, morphologic, chromosomal, 
                                                 
5 Colton C. Campbell and David P. Aueswald, Congress and Civil-Military Relationships 
(Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2015), 1. 
6 Szayna et al., Considerations for Integrating Women into Closed Occupations in the U.S. Special 
Operations Forces, xvii. 
3 
and hormonal characteristics and are classically defined as male and female.7 In some 
instances, however, such as Differences of Sexual Development (DSD), individuals might 
exhibit some characteristics of both sexes. Recent high-profile examples of DSD include 
Caster Semenya and Dutee Chand, two elite sprinters, who were disqualified by the 
International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF) from competing as women due 
to their high levels of naturally occurring testosterone, despite possessing external female 
anatomy.8 When discussing the physiological differences between sexes, this thesis will 
use the terms male and female. While acknowledging the non-binary aspects of sex, this 
study will categorically limit the use of terms to male or female. 
Gender, however, is an artificial construct based on behavior often associated with 
a specific sex. In a study on Special Operations Forces Mixed-Gender Elite Teams, the 
Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) classified behaviors like “bravery, repressed 
emotions, strength, and assertive behavior” as traditional, Western, and masculine. By 
contrast, behaviors of “nurturing, compassionate, weakness, and retiring behaviors” were 
considered feminine.9 Occupations can therefore become gendered when these behaviors 
reflect the archetype of the profession.10 Traditionally gendered occupations may feature 
common usage of gendered qualifiers such as “female doctor” or “male nurse” to 
differentiate these exceptions from the norm. The U.S. military and SOCOM traditionally 
recognized and rewarded classic masculine behavior.  
Issues can arise when sex and gender are conflated. For example, concluding that 
integrating women in a mixed gendered team will provide the team with a more 
compassionate perspective is inherently flawed. The possibility exists that the opposite in 
fact could be true; a woman could just as easily prove to be even more assertive and 
emotionally reserved than her male counterparts. Recognizing that the military does not 
                                                 
7 Farlex Partner Medical Dictionary, s.v. “sex,” accessed August 6, 2018, http://medical-
dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/VA. 
8 John Branch, “Dutee Chand, Female Sprinter With High Testosterone Level, Wins Right to 
Compete,” New York Times, July 27, 2015. https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/28/sports/international/
dutee-chand-female-sprinter-with-high-male-hormone-level-wins-right-to-compete.html. 
9 Turnley et al., “Special Operations Forces Mixed-Gender Elite Teams,” vii. 
10 Turnley et al., vii. 
4 
currently accept transgender recruits, throughout this study I will refer to an individual’s 
sex as being male or female and gender as being either a man or woman. 
Despite official exclusion from combat since the Revolutionary War, America’s 
history is full of examples of women who have distinguished themselves in combat. During 
America’s fight for independence, women participated in various warfighting roles, 
primarily working in the field hospitals and artillery units.11 Women even participated 
directly in combat in some instances by disguising themselves as men. Deborah Sampson 
fought in the revolutionary war dressed as a man until she was injured, hospitalized, and 
her sex discovered. She was ultimately discharged, but still qualified to receive a 
governmental army pension for her service and actions.12 Since America’s fight for 
independence, women have continued to serve in the military, including America’s most 
recent conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. As a notable example, Sergeant Leigh Ann Hester 
was the first woman to be awarded the Silver Star with valor13 since WWII for her role in 
leading a counterattack against an insurgent ambush in Iraq in 2005.14 Despite these 
examples, women were officially barred from direct ground combat until 2016. 
The language for the official exclusion of women from combat has changed 
multiple times in the past century. In 1948, President Harry S. Truman signed Executive 
Order 9981 outlining the United States’ military’s official position of equal treatment for 
all servicemembers; however, this position was held alongside other policies which limited 
the military careers of women and other minorities.15 Recent changes in integration policy 
                                                 
11 Linda Grant De Pauw, “Women in Combat: The Revolutionary War Experience,” Armed Forces 
and Society 7, no. 2 (1981): 209–26. 
12 Alfred F. Young, Masquerade: The Life and Times of Deborah Sampson, Continental Soldier. 
(Vintage Books, New York, NY, 2005). 
13 Awards “with valor,” typically denote heroic actions in combat. The Army defines the wearing of 
the “V,” device for “participation in acts of heroism involving conflict with an armed enemy.” 
14 Leigh Hester, “Recipient - Military Times Hall of Valor,” accessed February 10, 2019. 
https://valor.militarytimes.com/hero/3885. 
15 Military Leadership Diversity Commission, From Representation to Inclusion: Diversity 
Leadership for the 21st Century Military (Arlington, VA: Military Leadership Diversity Commission, 
2011). https://diversity.defense.gov/Portals/51/Documents/Special%20Feature/MLDC_Final_Report.pdf, 
12. 
5 
can be framed by examining the deviation from the “Risk Rule” established in 1988.16 In 
1994, the “Risk Rule” was rescinded and replaced by the “Ground Combat Rule,” formally 
known as the Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule (DGCDAR).17 The 
DGCDAR did two things: it formally defined direct ground combat and excluded women 
from participating in it.18 Fundamentally, this legislature changed the exclusion of women 
from perceived risk to the avoidance of direct ground combat. The DGCDAR shaped how 
women were integrated into our nation’s most recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. In 
2009, the Military Leadership Diversity Commission (MLDC) was established to provide 
the president and Congress a “comprehensive evaluation and assessment of policies and 
practices that shape diversity among military leaders.”19 Based in part by the findings of 
the MLDC, in 2013, the DGCDAR was removed and each military service commander—
including the Special Operations Commander (SOCOM)—was tasked to develop plans for 
gender integration or apply for an exemption. This period of review was officially 
designated Women In Service Review, or WISR.20 After quarterly meeting with the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and dozens of robust studies, no service chiefs applied 
for exemptions and all positions, including those in SOCOM, were made available to 
women in 2016. 
During the WISR, the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) directed all 
service chiefs and SOCOM to evaluate their physical standards. Before accepting women, 
Congress charged the Department of defense to ensure standards were gender neutral and 
would, “(1) accurately predict performance of actual, regular, and recurring duties of a 
                                                 
16 Susan Hennessey, “How the Rules Changed on Women in Combat: A Legislative and Executive 
History Primer,” Lawfare (January 26, 2013). https://www.lawfareblog.com/how-rules-changed-women-
combat-legislative-and-executive-history-primer. 
17 Susan Hennessey, “How the Rules Changed on Women in Combat: A Legislative and Executive 
History Primer.” 
18 The DGCDAR also excluded women where “job related physical requirements would necessarily 
exclude the vast majority of women Service members.” 
19 Military Leadership Diversity Commission, From Representation to Inclusion: Diversity 
Leadership for the 21st Century Military (Arlington, VA: 2011). https://diversity.defense.gov/Portals/51/
Documents/Special%20Feature/MLDC_Final_Report.pdf, xiii. 
20 “WISRJointMemo.Pdf,” accessed August 5, 2019. https://archive.defense.gov/news/
WISRJointMemo.pdf. 
6 
military occupation; and (2) are applied equitably to measure individual capabilities.”21 
There was a concern that the standards used were artificially high, gender discriminate,  or 
had limited predictive value.22 The standards were examined, and in some cases, changed 
to reflect occupational standards.23 Even after being validated and reaffirmed, the 
standards predicted high injury rates in women and that the number of qualified candidates 
would be small.24 Despite these concerns the SOCOM Commander, General Votel, 
reiterated, “The command will absolutely not lower, raise, or create multiple sets of 
standards for special operations.”25 SOCOM performs vital missions for our country’s 
defense. Its missions include but are not limited to direct action (DA), counter-proliferation 
of weapons of mass destruction (CWMD), unconventional warfare (UW), counterterrorism 
(COIN), special reconnaissance (SR), military information support operations (MSIO),  
foreign internal defense (FID), counterinsurgency (COIN), hostage rescue and recovery, 
foreign humanitarian assistance (HA), and security force assistance (SFA).26 SOCOM 
must balance the requirements of the force while integrating a uniquely different asset, 
women, into combat billets. Therefore, it is necessary to understand both the quantitative 
and qualitative aspects of gender integration for SOCOM. 
Women have played an integral role in SOCOM’s missions in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. Ad hoc units like the Female Engagement Teams (FETs), Cultural Support 
Teams (CSTs), and the “Lioness” program were created “due to the gender-restrictive 
environment in which it was not culturally acceptable for male Soldiers to interact with 
                                                 
21 Kristy N Kamarck, “Women in Combat: Issues for Congress,” n.d., 40. 
22 Chaitra Hardison, Susan Hosek, and Anna Saavedra, Establishing Gender-Neutral Physical 
Standards for Ground Combat Occupations: Volume 2. A Review of the Military Services’ Methods 
(RAND Corporation, 2018). https://doi.org/10.7249/RR1340.2. 
23 Hardison, Hosek, and Saavedra. 
24 “Marine Corps Gender Integration Research Executive Summary, United States Marine Corps, 
Military,” Scribd, accessed February 7, 2019. https://www.scribd.com/doc/280017557/Marine-Corps-
gender-integration-research-executive-summary. 
25 “Statement from USSOCOM on SECDEF’s Women in Service Review Decision,” accessed August 
31, 2019. https://www.socom.mil/Pages/womeninservicereview.aspx. 
26 “SOF Core Activities,” accessed November 17, 2019. https://www.socom.mil/about/core-activities. 
7 
Host Nation females” in Afghanistan and Iraq.27 These teams proved immensely useful in 
instances of tactical questioning, negotiations, signature management, and Key Leader 
engagements (KLE), producing tangible effects;28 however, the ad hoc nature of these 
units contributed to some of the issues with these programs. Most U.S. servicewomen were 
selected or “voluntold” to participate in these programs, often as a collateral duty, limiting 
both their availability and expertise in performing these duties.29 As a result, lack of 
relevant training, tactical competency, and physical fitness were reported across both the 
FET and CST.30 Finally, commanders reported issues with the women of these units, citing 
a lack of maturity and fraternization31 which detracted from their missions.32  
Integration of women in SOCOM has even more potential benefits than those 
historically provided through these ad hoc units. Integrating women in SOCOM can help 
with signature management of SR missions in urban areas, where observation is 
inevitable.33 Unlike rural or austere environments, SR missions in urban areas require 
operators to blend into the local populations to avoid detection. By incorporating women 
into these teams, SOF teams can better mimic the gender compositions and habits of the 
local population. Additionally, research in risk tolerance suggests a difference between 
men and women in their assessment of the probability and severity of negative outcomes34 
                                                 
27 U.S. Army War College, Female Engagement Teams (FET) Blueprint. Carlisle, PA U.S. Army War 
College, 2017.https://www.academia.edu/35312738/_U_Female_Engagement_Teams_FET_Blueprint.pdf, 
2. 
28 Heather Gregg, “Women in Special Operations: From Cultural Support Teams to an Enduring 
Capability,” May 2013, 9. 
29 Gregg, 14. 
30 Gregg, 33. 
31 Fraternization is a military crime punishable under article 134 of the UCMJ. 
32 Gregg, “Women in Special Operations: From Cultural Support Teams to an Enduring Capability,” 
32. 
33 Frederik Sunde and Marius Kristiansen, “Defying Stereotypes: The Untapped Potential of 
Integrating Female Reconnaissance Operators Into Small State NATO SOF,” Small Wars Journal, October 
2018. https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/defying-stereotypes-untapped-potential-integrating-female-
reconnaissance-operators-small. 
34 Christine R Harris and Michael Jenkins, “Gender Differences in Risk Assessment: Why Do Women 
Take Fewer Risks than Men?” Judgment and Decision Making 1, no. 1 (2006), 61. 
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and use different strategies in decision making environments.35 Gender integrated teams 
can provide more robust, diverse, and risk aware decisions when compared to all-male 
teams. 
Using the same physical test as Navy SEALs and SWCC, women have entered 
Navy Diver and Navy EOD billets in significantly lower rates and represent a very small 
portion of the community. Navy Divers first graduated women in 1975 and both Navy EOD 
and Navy Divers accepted women before the repeal of the DGCDAR. These units, 
therefore, can provide useful data for the integration of women into the SEALs and SWCC, 
the last remaining Navy Occupational Specialties (OS) closed to women. In a 2015 memo, 
the Naval Special Warfare commander expressed some concerns regarding women 
completing SEAL training citing Navy Diver and EOD statistics for comparison. Women 
account for only 0.6% of Navy Divers, 0.9% of Navy enlisted EOD, and 2.5% of Navy 
EOD officers. Graduation rates were also disparate between men and women candidates.36 
In EOD, enlisted women graduate at a rate of 13% compared to the 31% for men.37 For 
Navy Divers, 18% of women graduate compared to 47% for men.38 Similarly, attrition is 
also high in the SEAL community; however, competition for a training billet is greater. For 
men, graduation rates are 28% for enlisted and 65% for officers. As of this writing, no 
women have been selected to begin Basic Underwater Demolition/SEAL Training (BUD/
S) as an officer or enlisted. 
These factors suggest that comparatively few women would enter SOCOM. 
Motivated by concerns that disparity in graduation rates between sexes could result in 
additional pressure to reevaluate the battle-tested Assessment and Selection (A&S) 
methods, this research seeks to predict how many women should one should expect to enter 
                                                 
35 Phyllis Schiller Myers, “Gender Differences in Risk Behavior in Financial Decision-Making: An 
Experimental Analysis,” Journal of Risk and Insurance; Malvern 65, no. 1 (March 1998): 152. 
36 B.L. Losey, “Female Integration Implementation Plan for Naval Special Warfare” (official 
memorandum, San Diego, CA: Department of the Navy Naval Special Warfare Command, 2015). 
https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/WISR_Implementation_Plan_Navy.pdf. 
37 B.L. Losey, “Female Integration Implementation Plan for Naval Special Warfare,”  
38 B.L. Losey, “Female Integration Implementation Plan for Naval Special Warfare.” 
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SOCOM and analyze the best ways to address this potential gender representation 
discrepancy.  
All service branches have begun accepting women applicants into their respective 
A&S pipelines. The Navy admitted the first female midshipmen to SEAL Officer 
Assessment and Selection (SAOS) in 2017 with no subsequent candidates passing this 
initial selection.39 One women has completed RASP II for Army Ranger training,40 one 
woman completed the MARSOC Q-course but was not selected to continue training,41 and 
one woman has completed Army SF SFAS but has yet to attempt the Q-course at the 
writing of this thesis.42 The Air Force has reported nine women have attempted the 
Airforce Special Warfare Preparation Course, with one woman passing the eight-week pre-
selection preparations to begin A&S.43  
This thesis seeks to create a model that can be used to predict the number of women 
entering SOCOM in its previously closed billets. By accounting for the most influential 
variables and relationships, I created a base-line model that predicts the number of women 
who will enter SOCOM without any policy or administrative changes across variable time 
horizons. With a working steady state model, I adjusted, added, removed, and combined 
different variables to reflect different policies and strategies and measure performance. By 
evaluating both a strategy’s performance across five criteria: numerical performance, cost 
of implementation, reactivity and controllability, tenability, and perceived impacts to 
                                                 
39 Jeanette Steele, “1st Woman Drops out of Navy SEAL Training Pipeline,” San Diego Union 
Tribune, accessed February 6, 2019. https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/military/the-intel/sd-me-seal-
women-20170811-story.html. 
40 Meghann Myers, “This Woman Will Be the First to Join the Army’s Elite 75th Ranger Regiment,” 
Army Times, August 7, 2017. https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2017/01/18/this-woman-will-
be-the-first-to-join-the-army-s-elite-75th-ranger-regiment/. 
41 Gina Harkins, “1st Female Marine to Complete MARSOC’s 2nd Phase Is Leaving the Corps,” 
Military.com, October 21, 2018. https://www.military.com/daily-news/2018/10/21/1st-female-marine-
complete-marsocs-2nd-phase-leaving-corps.html. 
42 Meghann Myers, “A Female Soldier Has Made It through the Army’s Special Forces Selection,” 
Army Times, November 16, 2018. https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2018/11/14/a-female-
soldier-has-made-it-through-the-armys-special-forces-selection/. 
43 Stephen Losey, “In a First, Enlisted Woman Aims to Become Special Operations Weather Airman,” 
Air Force Times, March 29, 2019. https://www.airforcetimes.com/news/your-air-force/2019/03/26/in-a-
first-enlisted-woman-aims-to-become-special-operations-weather-airman/. 
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performance, combined with a qualitative analysis one can conclude the best strategy and 
provide recommendations for implementation. 
As a field, system dynamics use both quantitative and qualitative analyses to 
understand endogenous systems and how they behave. Endogenous systems are often 
identified by their feedback mechanisms, non-linear relationships, unpredictable behavior 
(especially over long periods of time). Developed by Jay Forrester at MIT in the 1950s, 
system dynamics is used in a variety of disciplines including engineering, manufacturing, 
anthropology, economics, social sciences, and physics.44 Forrester understood the 
potential of capturing dynamic relationships and calculating accumulations in an 
endogenous system, developing a calculus-based methodology for modeling referred to as 
a stock and flow model.45 Stocks represent the accumulations, or integrals, of the 
instantaneous changes system.46 The instantaneous changes, or flow rates, mathematically 
represent differentials in the system or the rate of change of the stocks over time.47 
Additionally, variables are used to capture the magnitude and relationships that exist 
between stocks and flows. The model will evaluate a total of three stocks: women eligible 
for military service, women in the military, and women in SOCOM.  
Without the aid of this model, it was difficult to determine what affect and 
magnitude one or multiple strategies would have on the number of females entering 
SOCOM because the dynamic and complex relationships that exist in the system. Without 
a model, strategies would have to be implemented and then evaluated to accurately 
determine performance. This process is both costly and has the potential to produce 
undesirable consequences that could affect mission readiness. 
In this thesis, I will examine three aspects to the integration of women into 
SOCOM. Chapter II will introduce the base-line model and how it predicts women entering 
                                                 
44 John Sterman, Business Dynamics: Systems Thinking and Modeling for a Complex World (Boston: 
Irwin/McGraw-Hill, 2000), 5. 
45 Sterman, 192. 
46 Sterman, 192. 
47 Sterman, 194. 
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SOCOM over time. In Chapter III, I evaluated the numerical performance of different 
strategies and evaluate them independently. In Chapters IV and V, I will compare proposed 
strategies with a metanalysis and provide my conclusion, recommendations for 
implementation, and opportunities for further research. 
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II. STEADY STATE MODEL 
All models are wrong, but some are useful 
George E.P. Box48 
 
A. STEADY STATE MODEL OVERVIEW 
The model consists of three stocks: women qualified for military service (𝐹𝐹1), 
women in the military (𝐹𝐹2), and women in SOCOM (𝐹𝐹3), where the value of each stock 
is captured for all women until they are no longer eligible for military service. Women exit 
the system and return to the general population when they become unfit for military service. 
Each stock is calculated at every time interval, measured in years. The numerical values 
and variable relationships were made on based on available open sources. Rationales are 
provided where key assumptions are made. 
Figure 1 shows the steady state stock and flow model, demonstrating how the stocks 
move from right to left through the system. By design, the model does not calculate the 
stocks before they enter or after they leave the system designated with the cloud symbol(s). 
The model does not account for any limitations that would affect the immigration of 
women into the system or the emigration as the stocks leave the system. Additionally, the 
model will not consider any environmental considerations that would otherwise impact the 
movement of women in or out of the system. For example, the relative pay between military 
and civilian jobs affects military separation rates and candidate quality but will not be 
represented in the model.49  
 
                                                 
48 George E.P. Box and Norman Draper, Empirical Model-Building and Response Surfaces (John 
Wiley & Sons, 1987), 424. 
49 James Hosek et al., “Military and Civilian Pay Levels, Trends, and Recruit Quality” (Rand 
Corporation, 2018), XIII. 
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Figure 1. Steady state stock and flow model 
Qualified Females applicants (𝐹𝐹1𝑥𝑥) is the first stock of the model. This stock, 
designated by a rectangle, represents the pool of qualified candidates that can be recruited 
for military service and is estimated to be 5 million women in 2018. This estimate is based 
on a study conducted by The Heritage Foundation which found that many young 
Americans are unfit for military service. Their findings suggest, “Over 24 million of the 34 
15 
million people of that age group [17-24 years old] cannot join the armed forces—even if 
they wanted to.”50 The biggest factors that preclude young Americans from service are 
health problems (32%), physical fitness (27%), education (25%), criminality (10%).51 The 
value for 𝐹𝐹1𝑥𝑥 is determined dividing the service-ready 10 million Americans in half, 
assuming the factors which disqualify candidates are equally distributed between men and 
women. This first stock is fed directly from the general population where flowrates 
eventually take one of two paths: women are either recruited into the U.S. military or leave 
the model as women become unfit for military service.  
The second stock, 𝐹𝐹2𝑥𝑥, represents women actively serving in the military. For this 
stock’s initial value, I used the numbers reported in the Department of Defense’s 2010 
Demographic Report which found that women accounted for 14.4% of the total force, 
numbering 203,695 women serving in total.52 For separation rates, I calculated the rate at 
which service members left the military, regardless of reason, based on two premises: the 
constant size of the U.S. military and the known recruitment rates. The size of the U.S. 
military has not changed significantly since the end of the Cold War, hovering just under 
1.5 million men and women in uniform from the mid-1990s to present (see Figure 1).53 
Using the constant size of the military and available recruitment rates, I calculated the 
military separation rates. Using the data from the Defense Manpower Data Center I 
determined the recruitment rate to be 12.99%. See Table 1. 
                                                 
50 Spoehr, “The Looming National Security Crisis.” 
51 Spoehr. 
52 Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense.2010-Demographics-Report. 2010. 
https://download.militaryonesource.mil/12038/MOS/Reports/2010-Demographics-Report.pdf. 
53 David Coleman, “U.S. Military Personnel 1954–2014: The Numbers,” History in Pieces (blog), 
July 24, 2014. https://historyinpieces.com/research/us-military-personnel-1954-2014. 
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Figure 2. U.S. active duty military size over time. Source: 
Coleman, David. U.S. Military personnel 1954–2104. 
Table 1. Separation rates calculated from Department of Defense fiscal year 2018 
recruiting and retention numbers54 
Recruitment FY 2018 
Service Goal Actual Size of Force 
Percentage 
Accession 
Army 76,500 69,972 474,944 14.73% 
Navy 39,000 39,018 330,290 11.81% 
Marines Corps 31,556 31,567 184,911 17.07% 
Air Force 29,450 30,343 325,152 9.33% 
Total 176,506 170,900 1,315,297 12.99% 
 
                                                 
54 “Department of Defense Announces Fiscal Year 2018 Recruiting and Retention,” U.S. Department 
Of Defense, accessed September 29, 2019. https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/
1691314/department-of-defense-announces-fiscal-year-2018-recruiting-and-retention-numbe/. 
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To reflect the constant size of the military over time, the two outgoing flowrates 
from women in the military (𝐹𝐹2𝑥𝑥), women separating from the military (𝑟𝑟3) and women 
joining SOCOM (𝑟𝑟4), are summed for the flowrate of women entering the military (𝑟𝑟2) to 
create self-regulating stock. This characteristic reflects in reality in the regards that the 
military changes the quality of recruits accepted to meet the services’ demands.55 All 
service members must join and complete a service branch’s boot camp or commissioning 
source before they can attend Assessment and Selection (A&S) for a SOCOM billet. For 
this reason, the model requires all applicants entering SOCOM to first enter the military 
population despite some specific direct accession programs (SF X-ray program and SEAL 
enlisted contracts).  
The final stock measures the number of women who have entered SOCOM in its 
previously closed billets (𝐹𝐹3𝑥𝑥). This stock is affected by two flow rates: the inflow is women 
seeking accession (𝑟𝑟4) and the outflow is women separating from SOCOM (𝑟𝑟5). For 
accession several variables affect the flowrate into SOCOM. One significant factor for 
women entering SOCOM’s previously closed billets is the attrition during the A&S 
pipelines themselves. Using data from 2007–2018, I determined the net average completion 
rate (𝑚𝑚) for all of SOCOM’s A&S pipelines. I summed the total number of graduates and 
divided by them by the total number of candidates to find the service-specific weighted 
completion rate for men from 2007–2018. The aggregate graduation rate was compiled as 
follows with unit specific identifier (SF, CCT, SEAL, Ranger, etc.) and either a “G” 
representing the graduates or a “C” to represent the total number of applying candidates 
(i.e. 𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆 would designate the total number of Special Forces that graduated from the years 
2007–2018). The equation for the average completion rate becomes: 
 
𝑚𝑚 =
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆 + 𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 + 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆 + 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 + 𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆 + 𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟𝑆𝑆 + 𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 + 𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶 + 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 + 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶 + 𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 + 𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟𝐶𝐶 + 𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶
 
 
                                                 
55 James Hosek et al., “Military and Civilian Pay Levels, Trends, and Recruit Quality.” 
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Female candidates do not have the same robust data for completion rates that exist 
for male candidates. One can compare the relatively small sample size of female candidates 
with that of the male candidates to determine if there is a statistically significant difference. 
In the past decade, the data showed 14,755 male candidates graduated out of 44,035 
candidates that were selected for training.56 During the same time frame, one of twelve 
women graduated in SOCOM’s newly opened positions. Using the N-1 Chi-square test, 
one can predict the likelihood that two populations, one large and one small, will have the 
same binary output, or for this research, graduation rates. With this calculation, I predict 
with a 93.53% probability that the graduation rates would be different in a similar sized 
population. Additionally, this calculation predicts with a 96.77% confidence that, between 
males and females, males will have the higher graduation rates. Acknowledging the 
evidence that males and females will have different graduation rates, I will still use the 
male graduation rates for both sexes assuming the nascent graduation rates for women may 
not reflect the long-term averages for women. Additionally, women have yet to attempt all 
the available positions in SOCOM which could further skew the initial results. This critical 
assumption will be reemphasized during the analyses of the model’s performance.  
This model also features a positive feedback loop in which the number of women 
in SOCOM affects the number of women seeking accession. Women are generally more 
reticent than men to apply for jobs for which they feel unqualified.57 A profound lack of 
representation of women in SOCOM could otherwise discourage women from seeking 
accession in SOCOM. To model this interaction, I used a susceptible, infected, and 
recovered model commonly referred to as a SIR model. The “infection” refers to the 
changing of beliefs so that women who felt underqualified or unable to apply for A&S for 
SOCOM are encouraged by other women’s success. The susceptible population are the 
women in the military (𝐹𝐹2𝑥𝑥) and the recovered population are the women in SCOOM (𝐹𝐹2𝑥𝑥). 
Women entering SOCOM in the previously closed billets have received tremendous 
                                                 
56 Jeff Pavelko, “US Special Operations Command.” 
57 Tara Sophia Mohr, “Why Women Don’t Apply for Jobs Unless They’re 100% Qualified,” Harvard 
Business Review (August 25, 2014): https://static1.squarespace.com/static/52f84192e4b0bae912c881e6/
t/564b37e6e4b03f66f2c62080/1447770086778/Why+Women+Dont+Apply+for+Jobs_HBR.pdf. 
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amounts of media coverage and their identities are usually known. For this reason, I 
assumed a 100% interaction rate between the populations with a very low infection rate 
(i.e., it would be difficult to encourage a new woman to apply for SOCOM). The infection 
rate used was 0.0001. A complete list of variables and initial conditions for the steady state 
model can be found in appendix A. 
B. STEADY STATE RESULTS 
This section reports the model’s prediction for the number of women in SOCOM 
with no changes to policy. The variables reported include the inflow and outflow of women 
in SOCOM, the total number of women in SOCOM, the number of women in the military, 
and the number of qualified female applicants. These will be the measures of performance 
analyzed across all models. The model uses a twenty-year time horizon starting in 2019 
and ending in 2039. By the end of the twenty-year time horizon the model predicts 71.6 
women will have made it into SOCOM. This is a 597% increase in women from 2018: 
however, women will account for only a small percentage of SOCOM’s roughly 15,500 
previously closed billets. The model achieves an equilibrium where the outflow of women 
is equal to the inflow of women at year 46 with 79 women in SOCOM. Results for a steady 
state prediction appear in Table 2. 
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Table 2. Steady state results 
Results From Steady State Model 
Year 
Women in 
SOCOM 
Inflow Outflow 
Women in the 
Military 
Qualified 
Female 
Applicant 
1 12.0 9.11 1.56 204k 5.0M 
2 19.2 9.24 2.50 204k 5.2M 
3 25.7 9.36 3.34 204k 5.5M 
4 31.5 9.46 4.09 204k 5.7M 
5 36.6 9.55 4.76 204k 6.0M 
6 41.2 9.63 5.35 204k 6.3M 
7 45.3 9.71 5.89 204k 6.5M 
8 49.0 9.77 6.36 204k 6.8M 
9 52.3 9.83 6.79 204k 7.2M 
10 55.2 9.88 7.17 204k 7.5M 
11 57.8 9.93 7.50 204k 7.9M 
12 60.1 9.97 7.81 204k 8.2M 
13 62.2 10.01 8.08 204k 8.6M 
14 64.0 10.04 8.32 204k 9.0M 
15 65.7 10.07 8.53 204k 9.5M 
16 67.1 10.09 8.72 204k 9.9M 
17 68.5 10.12 8.89 204k 10.4M 
18 69.6 10.14 9.05 204k 10.9M 
19 70.7 10.16 9.18 204k 11.4M 
20 71.6 10.17 9.30 204k 12.0M 
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C. STEADY STATE ANALYSIS 
The number of women in SOCOM remain relatively small, even over the relatively 
long twenty-year time period due to the system reaching equilibrium. This equilibrium is 
created between constant values for women in the military and the constant rate of 
separation form SOCOM. The only reinforcing loop for women is the perceived success of 
women in SOCOM, however, other variables that affect the flowrate of women into 
SOCOM limit the effectiveness of this feedback. The variable that most profoundly affect 
this flow rate is the female representation percent. Less than one percent (0.13%) of the 
previously SOCOM billets have been allocated to female candidates over their male 
counterparts between 2016 and 2018. This competition assumes women and men will have 
the same criteria for selection and will directly compete for the same SOCOM A&S billets. 
Of the women that do fit this criterion, the flow rate is restricted further by the successful 
the SOCOM A&S attrition rates.  
For evaluating performance, I will introduce the concept of tokenism and “critical 
mass” in my analyses. Tokenism refers the level of integration where a minority group 
suffers from its individuals status before reaching the status of subgroup.58 Tokens capture 
a higher awareness than their numerical representation warrants.59 Also tokens tend to 
assume the role of their sub-group in an organization more and end up contributing with 
their own individual personalities less.60 Tokenism can reinforce boundaries that exist 
between groups as the dominant group attempts to preserve their commonality in the 
presence of a token.61 For these reasons, I will consider gender integration that does not 
achieve numerical representation beyond tokenism to be sub-optimal. For performance, I 
will use 20% integration to be the standard for “critical mass” in the integration of women 
in SOCOM. Several studies on board room performance suggest that at 20% integration, 
women move beyond tokenism and achieve subgroup status, where group performance is 
                                                 
58 Rosabeth Moss Kanter, Men and Women of the Corporation (New York: Basic Books, 1977). 
59 Kanter. 
60 Kanter. 
61 Kanter. 
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often enhanced.62 I acknowledge, however, that this benchmark is not universally accepted 
and can still result in situations where women might retain “solo status” as the only woman 
in a small unit.63 Moreover, I acknowledge the profound differences that exist between 
board room decisions and the duties performed under SOCOM. Despite these caveats, I 
will use the 20% target, therefore, as a heuristic to evaluate an individual model’s 
performance and also for comparisons between models. 
Succinctly, the steady state model does not predict a tremendous number of women 
in SOCOM, even over a large time horizon, and approaches nowhere near the 20% 
threshold for critical mass. These results assume no changes occur in the next 20 years that 
would significantly impact the accession of women in SOCOM. Normatively, this has not 
been the case. In Army Ranger school, women have been reported to receive individualized 
instruction, access to special programs, and an atypical amount of recycles which have 
given women an advantage, not extended to their male peers, without adjusting the 
standards.64 Additional strategies and policies should be examined to influence integration 
to achieve critical mass or otherwise increase the representation of women in SOCOM. 
                                                 
62 Larelle Chapple and Jacquelyn E. Humphrey, “Does Board Gender Diversity Have a Financial 
Impact? Evidence Using Stock Portfolio Performance,” Journal of Business Ethics 122, no. 4 (July 1, 
2014): 709–23. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-013-1785-0. 
63 Schaefer et al., “Implications of Integrating Women into the Marine Corps Infantry.” 
64 “Was It Fixed? Army General Told Subordinates: ‘A Woman Will Graduate Ranger School,’ 
Sources Say,” PEOPLE.com, accessed November 8, 2019. https://people.com/celebrity/female-rangers-
were-given-special-treatment-sources-say/. 
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III. ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES 
Ignorance deprives people of freedom because they do not know what 
alternatives there are. It is impossible to choose to do what one has never 
“heard of” 
Ralph Barton Perry65 
 
With a working model, alternatives can be replicated to predict how different 
strategies and policies perform over time. In this Chapter I evaluated the performance of 
three different strategies affecting different components of the system: recruitment, 
selection, and retention. First, I modeled the effects of enhancing the “upsteam” stocks by 
increasing the number of women who are eligible for military service and the number of 
women represented in the military. Second, I evaluated the performance of a policy 
implementing a quota, focusing on increasing the representation of women during the 
selection portion of the model. Last, I will model a policy aimed at increasing the retention 
rate of women in SOCOM affecting the outflow or “downstream” portions of the model. 
The aim of testing these strategies is not to necessarily give a specific recommendation on 
how to implement, but to examine where in the system and what magnitude is need to 
produce optimal results. I introduce the following alternatives individually before 
comparing alternative strategies in the next chapter. 
A. ALTERNATIVE I: RECRUITMENT 
1. Recruitment Strategy Overview 
This strategy seeks to increase the number of women recruited into the military by 
increasing the number of both qualified women and women in the military. In order for 
this strategy to be effective, efforts must must be directed towards women in the 
developmental years before they are eligible for  military service. The aim of this strategy 
is to identify how changes in recruitment of women in the miltary affect the accenssion of 
                                                 
65 Ralph Barton Perry, The Citizen Decides, A Guide to Responsible Thinking in Time of Crisis 
(Bloomingto, IN, Indiana University Press, 1951), 9. 
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women in SOCOM. Providing one example, high school students who participate in Junior 
Reserve Officer Training Corps (JROTC) were reported to have higher GPAs, higher 
graduation rates, lower rates of teen pregnancy, and lower levels of gang violence.66 
Additionally, 20–25% of students in JROTC go on to serve in the military in one branch 
or another.67 Resources could be allocated to recruit young women into these and other 
programs that increase their eligibility of service, interest in military culture, and reduce 
the incidences of disqualifying crime. Tailoring recruitment strategies towards young 
women in these ways can increase the overall size and quality of female applicants. 
Another avenue to reinforce the recruitment of women is to better tailor the recruitment 
message to women. Using successful female servicemembers as recruiters could help 
reinforce the idea (for both men and women) that women also have exciting and prolific 
careers in the military. The United States Air Force has led this effort, releasing a 
recruitment video specifically tailored to women, featuring female only servicemembers.68 
Since this strategy is aimed at changing the attitudes, beliefs, and the demographics of 
women in the recruitment pool, this strategy could have a comparatively long time horizon 
before affecting the number of women in SOCOM.  
This strategy could face several resistances to implementation; chiefly perception 
of preferential treatment for women and competition for women interested in higher 
paying, less laborious careers. Women have steadily increased their representation in 
Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM) career fields, normalizing 
the presence of women in previously male-domintated fields, even outpacing men in some 
categories including doctoral degrees in biology.69 This increase in availability and 
opportunity of high paying and less physically demanding work has created competition 
                                                 
66 Kyle Rempfer, “Army Leaders Weigh Expanding JROTC in High Schools,” Army Times 
(November 9, 2019): https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2019/11/07/how-increased-footprint-in-
high-schools-may-help-army-fix-recruiting-shortfall/?utm_source=clavis. 
67 Kyle Rempfer, “Army Leaders Weigh Expanding JROTC in High Schools.” 
68 Giancarlo Casem. “Fighter Pilot Embodies ‘Captain Marvel’ Spirit,” U.S. Air Force (March 22, 
2019): https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/1792484/fighter-pilot-embodies-captain-marvel-
spirit/. 
69 Nancy N. Heilbronner, “The STEM Pathway for Women: What Has Changed?” Gifted Child 
Quarterly 57, no. 1 (January 1, 2013): 39–55. https://doi.org/10.1177/0016986212460085. 
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between women who are applying for more the more physically demanding and relatively 
lower income careers the military can offer. Second, allocating resources specifically 
targeted to the recruitment of women could breed resentment from men who might feel left 
behind or undervalued.  
This strategy was modeled by making two modifications to the steady state model. 
First, I added an additional variable to reflect  growing population of qualified women over 
time from increased interest in the military and a reduction of disqualifying criteria. 
Additionally, the model was initially designed to maintain the number of women in the 
military regardless of flow rates in and out of the stock through a balancing equation. I 
removed this balancing and feature and increased the flow rate in by 15%. This value was 
selected by evaluating an array of increased flow rates ranging from a annual increase of 
5% to 25% in Figure 3. I chose the value of 15% due to that rate’s ability to reach “critical 
mass” at 20% representation, in the military with roughly 300,000 women at the end of the 
20-year time horizon. 
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Figure 4. Recruitment strategy model 1 
2. Recruitment Strategy Results 
The steady state results from the model for the women in SOCOM appear in  
Table 3. The model uses a twenty-year time horizon starting in 2019 and ending in 2039. 
By the end of the twenty-year time horizon the model predicts 92.5 women will have made 
it into SOCOM. The model does not achieve an equilibrium and grows steadily even over 
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long time horizons, predicting 1.07k women at year 2119 (100 years later). Results for the 
recruitment strategy are below. 
Table 3. Recruitment strategy results 
Results from Recruitment Strategy Model 
Year 
Women in 
SOCOM 
Inflow Outflow 
Women in the 
Military 
Qualified 
Female 
Applicant 
1 12.0 9.08 1.56 203k 5M 
2 19.3 9.39 2.51 207k 5.22M 
3 25.9 9.70 3.37 211k 5.45M 
4 32.1 10.01 4.17 215k 5.70M 
5 37.8 10.31 4.91 219k 5.96M 
6 43.0 10.62 5.59 224k 6.23M 
7 47.9 10.92 6.23 228k 6.51M 
8 52.5 11.23 6.82 233k 6.81M 
9 56.8 11.54 7.38 237k 7.12M 
10 60.9 11.85 7.91 242k 7.45M 
11 64.7 12.17 8.42 247k 7.79M 
12 68.4 12.49 8.90 251k 8.25M 
13 72.0 12.81 9.36 256k 8.92M 
14 75.4 13.14 9.80 261k 9.06M 
15 78.7 13.48 10.23 267k 9.33M 
16 81.9 13.82 10.65 272k 9.77M 
17 85.1 14.17 11.06 277k 10.2M 
18 88.1 14.52 11.46 283k 10.7M 
19 91.2 14.89 11.86 288k 11.2M 
20 94.2 15.26 12.25 294k 11.7M 
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3. Recruitment Strategy Analysis 
The number of women in SOCOM remains small, even after a long period of time. 
The significant factors limiting the growth of women in SOCOM in the steady state model 
remain unchanged. Women encounter a tremendous decrease in the flow rates occurring 
between women in the military and women in SOCOM. The projected increase to 92.5 
women in SOCOM 20 years later is a 32% increase from the 70.3 women predicted by the 
steady state model. At year 20, women are projected to hold women at 0.4 % of the new 
open positions within SOCOM.  
Despite a minimal impact to the total number of women in SOCOM, this strategy 
was modeled to allow the representation of women of the military to grow. By the end of 
the 20-year time horizon, women in the military grew to 294k which puts them near 20% 
of the active duty forces, assuming no significant growth or reduction of forces from the 
roughly 1.5M active duty military personnel today, approaching my heuristic value of 20% 
representation. Additionally, the benefits from decreasing the number of young Americans 
who have felonies, are overweight, are medically unfit, or lack a high school diploma are 
not captured in this model or thesis but bear recognition. It appears the secondary benefits 
of this strategy may actually outweigh the measurable performance for women entering 
SOCOM, which is modest. Despite these shortcomings, this strategy might be worth 
pursuing purely for the benefits to young women and achieving ‘critical mass’ for women 
in the military. 
B. ALTERNATIVE II: SELECTION FOCUSED STRATEGY 
1. Selection Strategy Overview 
As previously mentioned, between 2016 and 2018, women only represented 0.13% 
of the SOCOM candidates when women directly competed with men for training billets in 
SOCOM. This difference could be due to the bias of the physical standards which produce 
inequal outcomes between men and women however those physical standards have been 
validated against occupational requirements and thus have been accepted as “fair.”70 
                                                 
70 Szayna et al. 
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Additionally, when considering fairness, a Rand report, found that normative standards 
could be perceived as unfair when used between groups: 
If normative standards that compare the relative standing oftest takers to 
each other are used (e.g., 90th percentile of all test-takers—regardless of 
gender), that male and female test scores are combined to form one norm 
group. The use of genderspecific norms to select candidates (e.g., 90% of 
female test takers and 90th percentile of male test takers) is not consistent 
with currently accepted definitions and interpretations of gender neutral 
standards. 
This strategy is aimed specifically at addressing this factor by implementing a quota 
for female candidates entering A&S. Since this strategy can be directed administratively, 
it has the potential to have significant and immediate impacts on the accession of women. 
Additionally, this strategy could be treated as a temporary or transitional policy to create a 
meaningful population of women in SOCOM after decades of exclusion. While the official 
entrance standards have been recently been validated against occupational requirements, 
there is a concern that the optimal entrance standards could have normatively been set so 
high that the criteria used to evaluate candidates excludes qualified and diverse candidates 
like women.71 While this strategy is useful to rapidly increase the accession of women into 
SOCOM, issues of fairness and equality may arise. The presence of two normative 
standards between genders could hurt trust and cohesion within units and could damage 
the perception of women who may not have benefited from the different sub group 
standards for selection. 
To illustrate how quotas might influence selection, I will briefly discuss Canada’s  
strategies, quotas, and their effects to inform the model. Canada initiated complete 
integration of its forces starting in 199072 but despite all positions being open, women were 
not represented in large numbers even decades later. By 2016 women only accounted for 
                                                 
71 Hardison, Hosek, and Saavedra, Establishing Gender-Neutral Physical Standards for Ground 
Combat Occupations. 
72 National Defence Government of Canada, Backgrounder; Women in the Canadian Forces. No.BG-
98-002, Canadian Armed Forces Report, 1998. http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/news/article.page?doc=women-
in-the-canadian-forces/hnlhlxa3. 
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14.9% of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF).73  Canada’s National Action Plan on 
Women, Peace, and security 2017—2022 sought to increase the representation of women 
by 1% per year until 2026 or until it achieved a 25% representation.74 Canada’s 
Department of National Defence (DND) implemented a 25% “soft quota” for the intake of 
women recruits in the Army in support of this target growth.75 Since, the DND found it 
was to early to distinguish if the efforts have placed their recruitment on track or not, but 
recorded only 14.9%of their recruits as women at the end of the March 2018 reporting 
cycle.76 One by-product of this quota is the increased gendering of specific occupational 
specialties within the CAF. Canada has employed employment equity (EE) targets in their 
selection of recruits for certain occupations. EE sheets specifically identified jobs in which 
CAF recruiters were “Accepting applications from females only.”77  
For the model, I calculated the effects of a quota which guarantees women 10% of 
the available positions for women entering the SOCOM pipeline. This assumes the total 
number of candidates will remain constant from year to year. Calculating 10% of the total 
SOCOM candidates per year yields 206.2 women candidates per year.  
                                                 
73 “Canada’s National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security 2017-2022 – Department of 
National Defence and The Canadian Armed Forces – Progress Report for Fiscal Year 2017/2018,” accessed 
November 10, 2019. https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/issues_development-
enjeux_developpement/gender_equality-egalite_des_genres/DND-wps-fps-MDN-17-22.aspx?lang=eng. 
74 “Canada’s National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security 2017-2022 – Department of 
National Defence and The Canadian Armed Forces – Progress Report for Fiscal Year 2017/2018.” 
75 Government of Canada, “Backgrounder, Women in the Canadian Forces.” 
76 “Canada’s National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security 2017-2022 – Department of 
National Defence and The Canadian Armed Forces – Progress Report for Fiscal Year 2017/2018.” 
77 “The Canadian Forces Jobs Where Only Women Need Apply, National Post,” accessed November 
10, 2019. https://nationalpost.com/news/canada/the-canadian-forces-jobs-where-only-women-need-apply. 
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Figure 5. Selection strategy model 
2. Selection Strategy Results 
The results from the selection model for the women in SOCOM are below. The 
model uses a twenty-year time horizon starting in 2019 and ending in 2039. The number 
of women entering SOCOM is regulated by the 10% quota predicting 206.2 women per 
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year. This number is derived by taking 10% of the average number of selected candidates 
(2,0602 candidates) in newly opened positions within SOCOM from the last 10 years.78 
By the end of the twenty-year time horizon the model predicts 1,459.3 women will have 
made it into SOCOM. This is a tremendous increase in the number of women in SOCOM, 
especially when compared to other possible strategies. The model grows quickly and 
reaches equilibrium at 1,587 women. This equilibrium is achieved by the number of women 
entering SOCOM (206.2 women) remaining constant and the stock growing until the 
outflow matches the inflow due to the separation rates. The growth of women in SOCOM 
for these sets of conditions stops at 1,587 women, there the model reaches equilibrium at 
year 64. Results for steady can be found in Table 4. 
  
                                                 
78 Jeff Pavelko, “US Special Operations Command.” 
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Table 4. Selection strategy model results 
Results From Selection Strategy Model 
Year 
Women in 
SOCOM Inflow Outflow 
Women in the 
Military 
Qualified Female 
Applicant 
1 12.0 206.2 1.6 204k 5.0M 
2 206.9 206.2 26.9 204k 5.2M 
3 377.7 206.2 49.1 204k 5.5M 
4 527.3 206.2 68.5 204k 5.7M 
5 658.5 206.2 85.5 204k 6.0M 
6 773.4 206.2 100.5 204k 6.3M 
7 874.1 206.2 113.5 204k 6.5M 
8 962.3 206.2 125.0 204k 6.8M 
9 1039.7 206.2 135.1 204k 7.2M 
10 1107.4 206.2 143.9 204k 7.5M 
11 1166.8 206.2 151.6 204k 7.9M 
12 1218.8 206.2 158.3 204k 8.2M 
13 1264.4 206.2 164.3 204k 8.6M 
14 1304.4 206.2 169.4 204k 9.0M 
15 1339.4 206.2 174.0 204k 9.5M 
16 1370.1 206.2 178.0 204k 9.9M 
17 1397.0 206.2 181.5 204k 10.4M 
18 1420.5 206.2 184.5 204k 10.9M 
19 1441.2 206.2 187.2 204k 11.4M 
20 1459.3 206.2 189.6 204k 12.0M 
 
3. Selection Strategy Analysis  
This strategy produces impressive results that achieve an promising equilibrium, 
however, the establishment of a quota could result in lower caliber of candidates and 
undermine the perception of women in SOCOM. As stated, the system achieves an 
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equilibrium of 1,587 women. When compared to the totality of SOCOM, that equilibrium 
pushes women much closer to what may be considered critical mass with a representation 
of 9.41% women. Another benefit of this strategy is that the quota rates are administratively 
controlled. If the demand for female operators changes then the quota can be adjusted 
accordingly to fit that demand. The main drawbacks of this strategy are two-fold; this 
strategy could admit potentially less qualified candidates into the highly competitive 
SOCOM A&S pipelines, displacing more qualified candidates and this quota could injure 
the perceptions of women entering SOCOM. This strategy could foster resentment from 
their male-counterparts for which no gender subgroup preference exist. It should be 
emphasized that as proposed, the strategy would still require females to meet the minimum 
standards for A&S. Presently, most applicants accepted in SOCOM submit scores 
significantly higher than the minimums. For example, on the official SEAL and SWCC 
website, NSW publishes both the minimum standards and optimal standards. For enlisted, 
the optimal calisthenic standards are 50% higher than the minimum standards (50 push-
ups minimum, 50 curl-ups minimum, and 10 pull-ups minimum versus 75 push-ups, 75 
curl-ups, and 15 pull-ups as optimal).79 The optimal swim and run times are significantly 
faster than the minimum s as well (minimum for the 500 yard swim is 12:30, optimal is 
9:30 and minimum for the 1.5 mi run is 10:30 and optimal is 9:30).80 For officers the 
optimal standards are even higher at roughly double the minimum scores and an even faster 
optimal swim and run times.81 No service chief sought an exception for gender integration; 
a position which was caveated that standards would not changed or double standards 
created.82 It is unclear how women might be perceived if they were accepted under a quota 
if their scores were between the minimum and optimal scores. Reflections on racial quotas 
imparted under the Philadelphia Plan cast doubt in the methods used to achieve the goals. 
Laurence Silberman, who helped justify the legality of the plan later stated, “ I now realize 
                                                 
79 Navy SEAL + SWCC Scout Team Center Naval Special Warfare, “NAVY SEAL TRAINING,” 
SEALSWCC.COM, accessed October 19, 2019. https://www.sealswcc.com/navy-seal-training.html. 
80 Navy SEAL + SWCC Scout Team Center Naval Special Warfare. 
81 Navy SEAL + SWCC Scout Team Center Naval Special Warfare. 
82 “Statement from USSOCOM on SECDEF’s Women in Service Review Decision.” 
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that the distinction we saw between goals and timetables on the one hand, and 
unconstitutional quotas on the other, was not valid. Our use of numerical standards in 
pursuit of equal opportunity has led ineluctably to the very quotas, guaranteeing equal 
results, that we initially wished to avoid.”83 SOCOM’s “unoffical-offical” benchmarks of 
performance could contribute to perceptions of a double standards and which in turn could 
affect cohesion and performance.  
C. ALTERNATIVE III: RETENTION 
1. Retention Overview 
For this last strategy, focuses on the retention aspect of the model to increase the 
overall number of women in SOCOM. Canada has used a combination of exit interviews/
surveys, tracking release data, and consultation with other militaries to better understand 
the trends associated with Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) female separation.84 The CAF 
has identified that “aspects such as family balance, job enjoyment, selection for 
professional development, velocity of promotion and a safe and harassment free work 
environment are all factors that contribute to making the CAF an Employer of Choice.”85 
This strategy is aimed at addressing these factors that contibute to the separation of women 
from the military. Additionally, injury rates profoundly affect graduation during A&S, 
estimated to be 80% in NSW,86 and the general health, longevity, and performance of 
operators. Not all injuries are preventable, however, evidence suggests that some lower 
extremity injuries can be avoided with higher mean fitness levels and training programs 
designed around higher intensity and lower intervals.87 A United Kingdom Ministery of 
                                                 
83 Paul Craig Roberts, Lawrence M. Stratton, and James S. Robb, “Proliferation of Privilege,” 
National Review, New York, November 6, 1995. 
84 “Canada’s National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security 2017-2022 – Department of 
National Defence and The Canadian Armed Forces – Progress Report for Fiscal Year 2017/2018.” 
85 “Canada’s National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security 2017-2022 – Department of 
National Defence and The Canadian Armed Forces – Progress Report for Fiscal Year 2017/2018.” 
86 B.L. Losey. “Female Integration Implementation Plan for Naval Special Warfare,” Official 
memorandum. San Diego, CA: Department of the Navy Naval Special Warfare Command, 2015. 
https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/WISR_Implementation_Plan_Navy.pdf. 
87 Journal of Special Operations Medicine (U.S. Special Operations Command, 2009). 
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Defense study found that “in initial military training, women have twice as much risk of 
musculoskeletal injury as men, and 15% to 20% higher rates of non-battle injuries in recent 
operations.”88 With respect to careers opportunities, women may not feel the same 
optimism as due to the lack of representation of women at the highest echelons within the 
U.S. military. Last, women can feel forced to choose between their careers and starting a 
family. Policies on career intermission programs, physical fitness permissions post-partum, 
and maternity leave can better facilitate a meaningful military career without foregoing the 
opportunity to have a family.  
 
Figure 6. Retention rate array 
                                                 
88 Randolf Fitriani and Ron Mathews, “Women in Ground Close Combat,” The RUSI Journal 161, no. 
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Figure 7. Retention strategy model 
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2. Retention Results 
The results from the Retention model for the women in SOCOM are below. The 
model uses a twenty-year time horizon starting in 2019 and ending in 2039. By the end of 
the twenty-year time horizon, the model predicts 107.5 women will have made it into 
SOCOM and eventually reaching an equilibrium at 155 women. This strategy does not 
perform particularly well since the inflow of women into SOCOM remains small. Results 
for steady state Are found in Table 5. 
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Table 5. Retention strategy results 
Results From Retention Strategy Model 
Year 
Women in 
SOCOM Inflow Outflow 
Women in the 
Military 
Qualified Female 
Applicant 
1 12.0 9.11 0.90 204k 5.0M 
2 20.0 9.26 1.50 204k 5.2M 
3 27.6 9.39 2.07 204k 5.5M 
4 34.8 9.52 2.61 204k 5.7M 
5 41.6 9.64 3.12 204k 6.0M 
6 47.9 9.75 3.60 204k 6.3M 
7 54.0 9.86 4.05 204k 6.5M 
8 59.7 9.96 4.47 204k 6.8M 
9 65.0 10.06 4.88 204k 7.2M 
10 70.1 10.15 5.26 204k 7.5M 
11 74.9 10.23 5.62 204k 7.9M 
12 79.4 10.31 5.95 204k 8.2M 
13 83.7 10.39 6.27 204k 8.6M 
14 87.7 10.46 6.58 204k 9.0M 
15 91.5 10.53 6.86 204k 9.5M 
16 95.1 10.59 7.13 204k 9.9M 
17 98.5 10.65 7.38 204k 10.4M 
18 101.7 10.71 7.62 204k 10.9M 
19 104.7 10.76 7.85 204k 11.4M 
20 107.5 10.81 8.06 204k 12.0M 
 
3. Retention Analysis  
Alone, this strategy only slightly alters the outcome from what would normally be 
expected from the steady state model. Despite using a value that would be difficult to 
achieve and nearly halving the separation rate (7.5% from 12.99%) it still takes more than 
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20 years to reach equilibrium. Additionally, the inflow does not change appreciably (10.6 
in the retention model, up from 9.99 from the steady state model by year 20). This strategy 
seems best be used in conjunction with other strategies which could increase the inflow of 
women into SOCOM.  
Independent of increasing the number of women in SOCOM, this strategy requires 
an investment in individuals. This strategy directly reinforces to the first SOF truth, 
“Humans are more important than hardware.”89 Managing that human talent, especially 
operators with unique attributes, makes implementation of this strategy attractive to leaders 
in SOCOM. An emphasis on identifying, training, and retaining talent already exists in 
SOCOM via multiple forms,90 however this strategy is specifically aimed at the unique 
considerations for maximizing a female operator’s career. 
                                                 
89 “SOF Truths Page,” accessed October 22, 2019. https://www.soc.mil/USASOCHQ/
SOFTruths.html. 
90 “USSOCOM Taking Care of the Force and Families to the next Level,” accessed November 15, 
2019. https://www.socom.mil/Pages/USSOCOMtakingcareoftheForceandFamiliestothenextlevel.aspx. 
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IV. META-ANALYSIS 
The analysis of data will not, by itself, produce new ideas 
Edward De Bono91 
 
A. META ANALYSIS OVERVIEW 
Having explored results and analyses for different gender integration strategies, I 
will now take a holistic approach to compare these strategies which have focused on 
separate aspects of the model (recruitment, selection and retention). For this cross-strategy 
comparison, I defined five criteria for analysis: numerical performance, cost of 
implementation, reactivity and controllability, tenability, and perceived impacts to 
performance. With these criteria, I performed a meta-analysis to determine which strategy 
or strategies should be implemented and to what degree. As a reminder, the retention 
strategy examined the effectiveness of increasing the number of women in SOCOM by 
increasing the number of women recruited into the military through shaping women’s 
interest in a military career and number of eligible candidates. The selection strategy 
modeled the implementation of a quota to increase the number of women who are admitted 
into training. The last strategy emphasizes the retention of women in the military through 
programs aimed at increasing occupational longevity, career flexibility, and job satisfaction 
of females serving in SOCOM. I evaluated the performance of different strategies using 
the results and initial conditions discussed in the previous chapter. 
B. NUMERICAL PERFORMANCE CRITERIA 
Of all the strategies, the selection focused quota produced the biggest magnitude of 
changes. This is unsurprising given the magnitude of the reduction in the stock and flow 
model caused by the female representation percent (𝑞𝑞) at 0.12%, meaning less than 1% of 
the available A&S billets were granted to women. For my analysis, I chose a flat 
                                                 
91 Edward De Bono, I Am Right, You are Wrong: From this to the New Renaissance: from Rock Logic 
to Water Logic (USA, Penguin group, 1991). 
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representation percent of 10% of the total candidates per year for SOCOM amounting to 
1,459.3 women at the end of the 20-year time horizon.  
By comparison, neither the recruitment or retention strategies produced significant 
changes to the number of women in SOCOM from the steady state model. The retention 
strategy performed slightly better (107.5 women) than the recruitment strategy (94.2 
women) at the end of the 20-year time horizon. It should be noted, however, the retention 
strategy reaches an equilibrium at 152 women whereas the recruitment strategy grows 
indefinitely. The recruitment strategy overtakes the retention strategy at year 32. A 
different timeline could lead to a different conclusion; however, the longer the time 
horizon, the less apt the model is to accurately predict outcomes due to changes outside the 
system. 
 
Figure 8. Recruitment and retention long-term performance 
C. COST OF IMPLEMENTATION 
In this section I examine an aspect of strategy implementation not previously 
evaluated: cost. I will provide rough estimates towards this pursuit; however, without 
exacting the cost, one can still compare the costs of these strategies due to the great 
differences that exists between them. Given the lack of granularity given to the cost 
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analysis, I will not overestimate the weight of the cost analysis during the meta-analysis or 
assign an exacting dollar amount. I considered two factors for evaluating costs: return on 
investment (ROI), where ROI is defined as the increase in female representation in 
SOCOM compared to dollars spent, and total cost defined as the magnitude of the absolute 
cost. Performance will be evaluated in another section. 
For the recruitment strategy, the total cost is high and the ROI low since the strategy 
focuses on changing the perceptions and eligibility over a large population. Over 18 million 
women are old enough to serve in the military, but only 5 million are eligible for service.92 
Limiting the scope of this strategy, tailoring programs, and focusing on “fence sitters” 
could help reduce the total cost of implementing this strategy. The term “fence sitters” 
refers to individuals who already have a favorable disposition towards the military but are 
not set on pursuing a career in the military or individuals who are interested in pursuing a 
military career but are ineligible or at risk for other reasons (i.e., not graduating high school, 
felonies, overweight, and health reasons). While performing well in other categories 
(increasing the number of eligible women and women in the military), this strategy does 
not perform particularly well at increasing the number of women in SOCOM, making the 
ROI low.  
Comparatively, the total cost of implementing a quota during selection is low and 
the ROI high. Costs associated with these programs could include additional restrooms and 
medical facilities to accommodate an influx of females in the A&S pipelines. In most 
instances, existing personnel and facilities would be able to fulfill most of these needs so 
any additional requirements would likely be small in scale and cost. The remaining costs 
of implementing a gendered quota would be largely administrative, adding little to the total 
cost. Between the low total cost of implementation and the highest number of additional 
women this strategy produces, this strategy has a high ROI. 
The costs associated with implementing the retention strategy are also low but 
perceived to be higher than that quota implementation and with a lower ROI. Costs 
                                                 
92 “The Looming National Security Crisis: Young Americans Unable to Serve in the Military, The 
Heritage Foundation,” accessed September 14, 2019. https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/the-looming-
national-security-crisis-young-americans-unable-serve-the-military. 
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associated with this strategy would include the hiring of trainers, dieticians, and medical 
professionals who are familiar with the unique aspects of elite female athletes and 
prolonging their careers. Like the Canadian Armed Forces, SOCOM could fund research 
to track female military separation data like the CAF to include reasons for departure, exit 
interviews, and job satisfaction surveys to better characterize women’s separation from 
SOCOM.93 
D. CONTROLLABILITY AND REACTIVITY 
For my analysis, I examined aspects of controllability and reactivity as to how 
easily SOCOM can regulate the changes for the accession of women into SOCOM and 
how quickly those changes manifest themselves in the results. For the recruitment strategy, 
the controllability is high, but the reactivity is low. The military has proven to be very 
efficient at maintaining its readiness despite dynamic personnel demands, interest, and 
levels of conflict. Increasing the number of eligible candidates and shaping favorable 
attitudes towards the military may take time. The selection strategy by comparison is both 
highly controllable and reactive to inputs. Admittance to SOCOM A&S is controlled 
administratively and could be tweaked relatively easily to reflect dynamic gender 
integration goals making this strategy highly controllable and reactive. This strategy does 
have limits, however, for example, it may not be possible to increase the quota beyond the 
number of qualified and interested female candidates already within the military. The 
retention strategy has low controllability and reactivity since this strategy has no bearing 
on the flow of women into SOCOM. This strategy is only capable of exerting control on 
the outflow of women from SOCOM, giving it little control or reactivity. The retention 
strategy could increase the separation rate easily, an aspect that is presently of little use as 
SOCOM looks to grow the number of women in SOCOM. 
                                                 
93 “Canada’s National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security 2017-2022 – Department of 
National Defence and The Canadian Armed Forces – Progress Report for Fiscal Year 2017/2018,” accessed 
November 10, 2019. https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/issues_development-
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E. TENABILITY 
We examined the tenability and perception of implementation from the perspective 
of three different stakeholders: SOCOM, Congress, and the American people. I chose these 
stakeholders to represent the service provider (SOCOM), the legislative authority 
(Congress), and the beneficiary of the services provided (the American people). This 
section is subjective, but by evaluating policies, polls, and statements one can approximate 
how different strategies would likely be received by different stakeholders. 
The recruitment strategy would likely receive support from all three stake holders. 
Both SOCOM and the American people would benefit from this strategy in terms of higher 
representation of women for SOCOM and the numerous secondary benefits of this strategy 
discussed in Chapter III. Congress, which would allocate financing for this strategy, and 
the White House are battling over the reduction of the budget of current social programs 
and would likely be reluctant to fund additional social programs.94  
The selection strategy using a quota would likely lack support from the American 
people and SOCOM but still garner support within Congress. Unofficial polls of the 
American people show a lack of approval in general for the integration. In an unofficial 
poll in 2013, 78% of respondents responded “no” when asked if women should serve in 
the Navy SEALs.95 Many people went to social media sharing their skepticism (and 
doubts) that women would make it through A&S without changing the standards. SOCOM 
has remained constant regarding its attitudes towards separate standards and perception of 
double standards.96 Using a quota deviates from both of these tenets and is likely to face 
harsh criticism from SOCOM if implemented. Congress, however, would likely be 
supportive (or at least accepting) of such a retention strategy, considering the series of 
                                                 
94 Richard Krogan et al.”Cuts to Low-Income Assistance Programs in President Trump’s 2020 Budget 
Are Wide-Ranging,” Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, May 15, 2019. https://www.cbpp.org/
research/federal-budget/cuts-to-low-income-assistance-programs-in-president-trumps-2020-budget-are. 
95 Matthew T. Hall, “Prospect of women Navy SEALs called good, crazy,” San Diego Union-Tribune 
(June 17, 2013): https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/opinion/the-conversation/sdut-women-navy-seals-
reaction-2013jun17-htmlstory.html. 
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socially progressive military legislation passed in the past decade97 and recent support 
from rulings by the Supreme Court,98 therefore, the retention strategy would likely be 
accepted by all stakeholders. Support for furthering women’s careers would face little 
criticism from the American people and SOCOM have repeatedly emphasized the 
acceptance of women into its ranks with current, validated standards and would benefit 
from increased representation of women, especially at senior levels. Congress would likely 
be supportive of a method of implementation given its support for other programs aimed 
at maximizing SOF careers and performance like Preservation of the Force and Family 
(POTFF) and more specifically Human Performance Program (HPP).99 
F. PERCEIVED IMPACTS TO PERFORMANCE 
In this study, I have not discussed how these strategies might impact performance 
beyond the benefits of integrated teams. The way in which these strategies increase the 
number of women in SOCOM differ in the quality and type of candidates they produce, 
which ultimately contributes to combined performance. The recruitment strategy aims to 
increase the participation and eligibility of “fence sitters” who otherwise might not pursue 
a career in the military. Recruits who need additional persuasion or would otherwise be 
ineligible due to obesity would likely lack the physical requirements or possess the desire 
to compete for screened training billets within SOCOM. In the Navy, even the top female 
scores on the Physical Screening Testing, used by navy divers, EOD, SEALs, and SWCC, 
scored lower than the average males on the tests.100 If the top performing women are still 
scoring in the bottom half of male applicants, then it is unlikely the newly eligible 
candidates would be submitting competitive scores. Of these three strategies, the 
                                                 
97 Colton C. Campbell and David P. Aueswald, Congress and Civil-Military Relationships 
(Georgetown University Press, 2015). 
98 “Eyder. Peralta “Supreme Court Upholds University Of Texas’ Affirmative Action Program,” NPR, 
last modified June 23, 2016. https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/06/23/483228011/supreme-
court-upholds-university-of-texas-affirmative-action-program. 
99 “About POTFF,” accessed November 30, 2019. https://www.socom.mil/POTFF/Pages/About-
POTFF.aspx. 
100 Chaitra Hardison, Susan Hosek, and Anna Saavedra, Establishing Gender-Neutral Physical 
Standards for Ground Combat Occupations: Volume 2. A Review of the Military Services’ Methods 
(RAND Corporation, 2018), 2. https://doi.org/10.7249/RR1340.2. 
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recruitment strategy is predicted to produce the lowest quality of candidates and produce 
the biggest detriment to performance.  
The selection strategy, or quota implementation, would also likely negatively affect 
performance. This strategy creates a separate standard for female candidates than men and 
could produce less physically qualified candidates. I focused largely on the difference in 
physical scores between sexes but implementing a quota could lead to a disparity between 
Armed Service Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) scores, evaluations of character, 
leadership experience, Computerized Special Operations Resilience Test (C-SORT) 
results, and academic performance. Further, the statistical analysis of historic graduation 
rates suggests women will not graduate at the same rates as men when they compete 
directly for SOCOM A&S billets. Admitting less competitive candidates would likely 
result in even lower graduation rates. In an evaluation of NSW A&S standards, the Rand 
Corporation found physical tests administered during training relate to training success and 
that the candidates submitting physical scores near or at the minimums had “essentially no 
chance of being accepted,”101 a consequence which could result in a reduction in the total 
output of SOCOM operators. 
Finally, the retention strategy has the potential to increase overall performance 
within SOCOM by increasing the participation of women in the higher levels of leadership. 
Though criticized by the Secretary of the Navy, Ray Mabus,102 the Marine Corp’s results 
for gender integrated units on combat suggests a decrease in combat performance of 
gender-integrated units compared to all male units.103 All-male teams performed better at 
93 of the 134 tasks evaluated and suffered injury at roughly half the rate of women.104 
Critics of the study pointed out that the conclusions were based on averages of 
                                                 
101 Hardison, Hosek, and Saavedra, 2. 
102 The Secretary of the Navy is the civilian appointee who oversees the Navy and Marine Corps. 
103 “Controversial Marine Corps Study On Gender Integration Published In Full,” NPR.org, accessed 
December 1, 2019. https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/11/04/454672813/controversial-marine-
corps-study-on-gender-integration-published-in-full. 
104 “Marine Corps Gender Integration Research Executive Summary, United States Marine Corps, 
Military,” Scribd, accessed February 7, 2019. https://www.scribd.com/doc/280017557/Marine-Corps-
gender-integration-research-executive-summary. 
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performance, instead of individual performances, potentially masking the results from high 
performing women.105 The Marine Corps defended these results by specifying Marines 
work as teams, not individuals.106 Other criticisms of the study include the disparity of 
experience between the men and women selected for the study, the lack of cohesion during 
the study, and the recently repealed segregation of marine corps boot camp as biases 
introduced into the study.107 Despite this harsh criticism of the study’s methodology and 
biases, no further research was commissioned to address or counter the study’s findings. 
By comparison, strong evidence suggests real benefits of integrating women into board 
rooms and decision-making teams, especially in risk analysis.108 Extending the careers of 
women from the entry level positions of SOCOM into these senior-level positions would 
likely improve groups performance. Virtually every command within SOCOM has females 
and female leaders in its ranks, with women with Gender Advisors (GENADs) regularly 
participating in senior level decision making. Women in the newly opened SOCOM billets 
would have the opportunity to take on new roles, including commanding officers, in these 
groups. An overview of the strategy analyses can be found in Table 6. 
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Table 6. Strategy meta-analysis overview 
 
 
  Strategies 
  Recruitment Selection Retention 
 
C
ri
te
ri
a 
Numerical 
Performance 
Low; modest 
results that 
grows over time 
 
High; significant 
growth over the 
20-year time 
horizon 
 
Low; modest 
results that reach 
equilibrium 
Cost of 
Implementation 
High cost; 
changing the 
eligibility and 
attitudes of large 
populations 
requires 
significant 
resources 
 
Low cost; 
implementation 
is predominately 
administrative 
and additional 
costs are minor 
Low/moderate 
cost; additional 
studies and 
personnel will 
represent bulk of 
the costs 
Controllability and 
Reactivity 
High 
controllability, 
low reactivity; 
flexible 
recruitment rates 
and generational 
attitude changes 
 
High 
controllability, 
high reactivity; 
largely 
administratively 
controlled and 
flexible 
Low 
controllability, 
low reactivity; 
strategy only 
affects SOCOM 
outflow 
Tenability 
Net high; little 
concerns over 
helping young 
women or 
shaping a 
positive view of 
the military 
 
Net low; 
significant 
deviation from 
norm with likely 
negative effects 
on cohesion  
Net high; post 
A&S individual 
investment are 
high and does 
not deviate  
Impacts to 
Performance 
Net negative; 
additional 
recruits might 
lack high 
motivation or 
physical scores 
for SOCOM 
Net negative; 
lower caliber of 
candidates might 
produce few 
graduates  
Net positive; 
increased 
number of 
women in senior 
roles 
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G. META-ANALYSIS 
Having compared the three different strategies across the five criteria, one is now 
equipped with the requisite analyses to perform a meta-analysis. For this analysis I assigned 
a composite for each criteria one (least desirable) through five (most desirable) and sum 
the scores for each strategy to determine the best performing strategy. The definition for 
scores of one, three, and five will be provided in the Table 7. 
Table 7. Meta-analysis criteria definition 
 Numerical performance 
Cost of 
implementation 
Controllability 
and reactivity Tenability 
Impacts to 
Performance 
5 (Highest) 
Strategy performs 
optimally within 
prescribed time 
horizons 
Strategy has low 
total cost of 
implementation 
and High ROI 
Strategy 
exhibits high 
levels of 
controllability 
and reactivity 
Strategy is 
highly 
tenable with 
all three 
stakeholders 
Dramatic net 
improvement 
to 
organizational 
performance 
4      
3  
Strategy exhibits 
moderate 
performance but 
does not achieve 
optimal results 
within prescribed 
time horizons 
Strategy either 
exhibits average 
total cost and 
ROI or some 
combination of 
high or low total 
cost and ROI 
Strategy either 
exhibits average 
controllability 
and reactivity or 
some 
combination of 
high and low 
controllability 
and reactivity 
Between 
three 
stakeholders, 
net tenability 
is neutral 
Neutral or no 
change to 
organizational 
performance 
2      
1 (lowest) 
No change or 
detrimental 
change when 
compared to 
steady state 
model 
Strategy predicts 
high total cost 
and low ROI 
Strategy 
exhibits low 
levels of 
controllability 
and reactivity 
Strategy is 
untenable 
for all three 
stakeholders 
Dramatic net 
negative 
impact to 
organizational 
performance 
 
Using the above definitions and my analyses, I determined the selection and 
retention strategies tie with the best net score of 16 each. The recruitment strategy falls 
behind the other two strategies with a net score of 11. I acknowledge the utility of such a 
rank ordering while acknowledging that the final verdict requires a deeper examination. 
Rather than declare a tie between the selection and retention strategies, I further dissected 
each strategy’s performance and my own estimations to inform my final recommendation. 
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Referencing Table 8, I struggled with what would be the correct or “fair” 
estimations of two specific values: the tenability of the selection strategy and the impacts 
to performance for the retention strategy. For the tenability of the selection strategy, I 
assigned a value of two. I believed to assign a value of one, the analysis required all three 
stake holders believing the strategy to be untenable. For the tenability of the selection 
strategy, both SOCOM and the American people rejected this strategy. Since the support 
criteria was binary, I believed congress could support this strategy; but perhaps a better 
estimation might be that Congress “consents” to this strategy. I do not perceive significant 
support at the congressional level to aggressively advance representational policies as have 
been seen in previous decades or in other countries.109 Congress’s neutrality towards this 
policy places it at a two by the narrowest of margins. If I had not so rigidly defined the 
scoring, a 1.5 might have been a more accurate representation of this strategy’s actual 
performance. The other value assignment for contemplation is the impact to performance 
of the retention strategy. I scored this strategy at a 4, citing the benefits it produced, 
especially in the senior, higher-level decision-making environments. Again, my hyperbolic 
language limited the accuracy of strategy’s performance. The retention strategy is the only 
strategy which is predicted to produce net positive results to performance. This factor alone 
distinguishes this strategy notably above the others and might be closer to a 4.5, 
comparatively. 
Both the micro shifts in the scoring matrix suggest that the retention strategy is the 
best performing strategy, making it my recommendation for implementation. Additionally, 
the retention strategy was the only one that was predicted to produce a net positive impact 
to performance. Despite modest performance and a severe lack of controllability, this 
strategy is highly tenable, low in cost, and likely to improve the performance of SOCOM 
as an organization.  
  
                                                 
109 “Canada’s National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security 2017-2022 – Department of 
National Defence and The Canadian Armed Forces – Progress Report for Fiscal Year 2017/2018.” 
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Table 8. Meta-analysis scoring matrix 
 
  Strategies 
  Recruitment Selection Retention 
 
C
ri
te
ri
a 
Numerical Performance 2 4 2 
Cost of Implementation 1 5 4 
Controllability and Reactivity 2 4 1 
Tenability 4 2 5 
Impacts to Performance 2 1 4 
 Net Score 11 16 16 
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V. CONCLUSION  
If you want a happy ending, that depends, of course, on where you stop 
your story 
Orson Welles110 
 
To the original question, “How should SOCOM look to increase the representation 
of women?” one arrives at a mixed conclusion. By using a retention-focused strategy, 
SOCOM can best leverage the benefits of gender integration, but this strategy alone does 
not reach the threshold of critical mass. The only strategy that produces critical mass—
selection and quota focused—requires significant concessions in tenability and 
performance, making it, in my estimation, invalid. Focusing on recruitment produces little 
results for the integration of women in SOCOM. Scrutiny should be placed on efforts to 
recruit “fence sitters” into SOCOM who otherwise were ineligible or not interested in 
pursuing a military career due to this strategy’s high costs and inconsequential results.  
Second, if legislators and SOCOM can agree on optimal goals for gender 
integration, then the model could be used calculate what magnitude of changes would be 
needed to produce those results. Additionally, the time horizon can be shifted to align with 
the established timelines for implementation. Using a hybrid of strategies discussed may 
prove an efficient way to achieve these results. A combination of selection and retention 
policies could produce superior net results than any one strategy alone. Again, I only 
explored three different strategies. There could be any number or strategies that might 
affect the model in unique ways not explored in this thesis. 
Finally, the logical question that follows is, “How does SOCOM leverage women 
to maximize the benefits of mixed gender teams?” If you believe necessity is the mother 
of invention, then a solution may have already been found. I believe the ad hoc female 
engagement teams, specifically the CST model, could more reliably provide SOCOM with 
the benefits of mixed gender teams, and in greater numbers, without requiring women to 
                                                 
110 Orson Wells, The Big Brass Ring (Santa Barbra, CA, Santa Teresa Press, 1987). 
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go through the same A&S to access the unique gender benefits of integrating women. Even 
with the benefits of the retention strategy, out model predicts only 105.6 women across the 
15,500 newly opened SOCOM billets after 20 years. Women will continue to apply, get 
selected, and graduate through the established SOCOM A&S pipelines, but to ensure the 
unique capabilities women provide are reliably accessible to the SOCOM community, the 
auxiliary role of all female units could be codified and supported. This remedy is outside 
the scope of this thesis, however, and requires further research and review for 
consideration. 
55 
APPENDIX. STEADY STATE VARIABLE LIST 
Steady State Model 
Variable Description Type Function 
Initial 
Value 
 𝐹𝐹1𝑥𝑥 
Eligible Female 
applicants Stock 𝐹𝐹1𝑥𝑥 = (𝐹𝐹1𝑥𝑥−1)(𝑅𝑅) − (𝑟𝑟2 + 𝑟𝑟3) 5M 
  𝐹𝐹2𝑥𝑥 
Women in the 
military Stock 𝐹𝐹2𝑥𝑥 = 𝐹𝐹2𝑥𝑥−1 + 𝑣𝑣1 − 𝑦𝑦2 203k 
  𝐹𝐹3𝑥𝑥 Women in SOCOM Stock 𝐹𝐹3𝑥𝑥 =  𝐹𝐹3𝑥𝑥−1 + (𝐹𝐹2𝑥𝑥−1)(𝑟𝑟1)(𝑟𝑟2)(𝑟𝑟3) 12 
 𝑟𝑟1 
Flowrate from 
general population to 
recruitment age Flowrate 𝑟𝑟1 = 𝑅𝑅(𝐹𝐹1𝑥𝑥−1)  250k 
 𝑟𝑟2 
Flowrate from 
recruitment age to 
military Flowrate 𝑟𝑟2 = 𝑟𝑟4 + 𝑟𝑟5  26.5k 
 𝑟𝑟3 
Flowrate from 
recruitment age back 
to general population Flowrate N/A  0 
 𝑅𝑅 
Population growth 
Rate Variable N/A  .05 
 𝑟𝑟4 
Separation rate from 
the military Flowrate 𝑟𝑟4 = (𝐹𝐹2𝑥𝑥)(𝑠𝑠)  26.5k 
 𝑟𝑟5 
SOCOM Assessment 
and Selection Flowrate 𝑟𝑟5 = ((𝐹𝐹2𝑥𝑥)(𝑅𝑅) + 𝑝𝑝)(𝑚𝑚)(𝑞𝑞)  N/A 
 𝑟𝑟6 
Women in SOCOM 
separation Flowrate 𝑟𝑟6 = (𝐹𝐹3𝑥𝑥)(𝑠𝑠)  N/A 
 𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓 
Female 
representation Variable N/A  12 
 𝑞𝑞𝑚𝑚 Male representation Variable N/A  9.28k 
 𝑞𝑞 
Female 
representation 
percent Variable N/A .00129 
 𝑝𝑝 
Perceived success of 
women in SOCOM Variable 𝑝𝑝 = (𝐹𝐹2𝑥𝑥)(𝐹𝐹3𝑥𝑥)(0.0001)  2.9k 
 𝑅𝑅 
Population growth 
rate Variable N/A  1.05 
 𝑅𝑅 
Women seeking 
accession Variable N/A  0.05 
𝑠𝑠 
Military separation 
rates Variable N/A 0.1299 
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